DECODING SECTION 29A: SUPREME COURT RESOLVES JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICT IN ARBITRATION EXTENSIONS

INTRODUCTION

 The Supreme Court of India in Jagdeep Chowgule v. Sheela Chowgule & Ors. (2026 INSC 92) resolved a long-standing jurisdictional controversy under Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the “Act”): which court has the authority to extend the mandate of an arbitral tribunal?

The judgment conclusively resolves a long-standing divergence among High Courts and has far-reaching implications for curial supervision, judicial hierarchy, and procedural certainty within domestic arbitration.

STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: SECTION 29A AND THE DEFINITION OF “COURT”

Section 29A was introduced to ensure time-bound completion of arbitral proceedings, empowering “the Court” to extend the mandate of the arbitral tribunal and, if necessary, substitute arbitrators. However, the provision does not independently define the term “Court”. Section 2(1)(e) of the Act defines “Court” as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, or the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the arbitration.

The interpretative conflict arose because Section 11 confers the power of appointment of arbitrators exclusively on the Supreme Court or the High Courts, raising the question whether the same court must also exercise powers under Section 29A.

DIVERGENT JUDICIAL VIEWS: TWO COMPETING STREAMS

Section 29A assumes particular importance because failure to extend the mandate within time results in automatic termination of the tribunal’s mandate, potentially derailing ongoing arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court noted that High Court jurisprudence on Section 29A had evolved into two competing interpretative streams.

Stream A: Judgments taking the view that ‘Court’ in Section 29A is Court as defined in Section 2(1)(e).

This line of judgments holds that the expression “Court” in Section 29A must be read strictly in accordance with Section 2(1)(e) of the Act. Once an arbitrator is appointed either by consent of parties or through Section 11 proceedings, the jurisdiction of the appointing court stands exhausted, rendering it functus officio. Therefore, any applications for extension of mandate under Section 29A must lie before the Principal Civil Court or the High Court with original civil jurisdiction, as the case may be. The High Courts subscribing to this view emphasized that the statutory language is unambiguous. Where the legislature intended to exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Courts, it has done so expressly, as evident from provisions such as Sections 47 and 57. In contrast, Section 29A draws no distinction between arbitrators appointed by courts and those appointed by the parties, thereby reinforcing the applicability of Section 2(1)(e) without qualification.

Stream B: judgments interpreting the term “Court” in Section 29A contextually to disapply Section 2(1)(e)

The opposing stream of judgments proceeds on the reasoning that, where an arbitrator is appointed by the High Court under Section 11(6), permitting a Civil Court to extend or terminate the arbitral mandate under Section 29A would give rise to a jurisdictional anomaly. In such a situation, a subordinate court would, in effect, exercise supervisory authority over an arbitrator appointed by a constitutional court. It is further contended that a similar conflict could arise between the High Court and the Supreme Court in cases of international commercial arbitration. To obviate these perceived conflicts, courts adopting this approach invoke the interpretative caveat contained in Section 2(1) “unless the context otherwise requires” and argue that the context of Section 29A necessitates a departure from the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e).

SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS: SEPARATION OF APPOINTMENT AND SUPERVISION

The Supreme Court decisively rejected the contextual approach adopted by the judgments falling under Stream B. Upon an extensive examination of the jurisprudence surrounding Section 11 particularly in light of the 2015 amendments and the introduction of Section 11(6A),  the Court reaffirmed that the scope of judicial inquiry at the appointment stage is strictly confined to a prima facie determination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. Once the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the jurisdiction of the appointing court stands fully exhausted, leaving no residual supervisory or controlling authority with either the Supreme Court or the High Courts over the conduct of arbitral proceedings.

The Court rejected the notion that appointing courts continue to “monitor” arbitral proceedings. Such an interpretation, it held, would improperly conflate appointment powers with supervisory jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory framework of the Act. The Supreme Court further held that apprehensions regarding hierarchical conflict or jurisdictional anomaly are unfounded. Proceedings under Section 29A do not partake the character of appointment; rather, they fall squarely within the realm of curial supervision, which the Act consciously vests in the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e). Permitting a Civil Court to extend or terminate the mandate of an arbitral tribunal, therefore, does not encroach upon the authority of the High Court or the Supreme Court, particularly since the appointing court becomes functus officio upon constitution of the tribunal.

RELIANCE ON NIMET RESOURCES INC. V. ESSAR STEELS LTD.

The Court placed substantial reliance on Nimet Resources Inc. & Anr. v. Essar Steels Ltd. ((2009) 17 SCC 313), which enunciated two principles of enduring relevance. First, issues pertaining to the continuation, termination, or substitution of an arbitral mandate are matters of curial supervision and must be addressed by the “Court” as statutorily defined under the Act. Second, the jurisdiction exercised under Section 11 stands exhausted upon the appointment of the arbitral tribunal, rendering the appointing court functus officio. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court held that proceedings under Section 29A do not partake the character of appointment contemplated under Section 11; rather, they constitute a procedural mechanism intended solely to ensure the timely completion of arbitral proceedings.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court conclusively held that:

• Applications under Section 29A must be filed before the “Court” as defined under Section 2(1)(e) of the Act.

• The fact that the arbitrator was appointed by the High Court or Supreme Court under Section 11 is irrelevant.

• Concerns of hierarchical conflict or jurisdictional anomaly are misplaced and unsupported by the statutory scheme.

This judgment reinforces the principle of minimal judicial intervention, preserves the autonomy of arbitral proceedings, and brings much-needed certainty to procedural jurisdiction under the Act.

The ruling also settles a persistent jurisdictional ambiguity and restores doctrinal coherence to the relationship between Sections 2(1)(e), 11 and 29A of the Act.

ANHAD LAW’S PERSPECTIVE

From a practitioner’s standpoint, the Supreme Court’s ruling is a decisive reaffirmation of the structural discipline embedded in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. By drawing a clear distinction between appointment jurisdiction under Section 11 and curial supervision under Section 29A, the Court has halted the creeping judicial re-centralisation of arbitration an outcome the 2015 and 2019 amendments consciously sought to avoid.

For corporate stakeholders and arbitral participants, the judgment brings welcome predictability. Applications for extension of an arbitral mandate under Section 29A will lie before the statutorily designated Civil Court or the High Court exercising original civil jurisdiction, irrespective of the mode of appointment of the arbitrator. Notably, original civil jurisdiction is exercised only by the High Courts of Delhi, Bombay, Madras, Calcutta, and Himachal Pradesh. This clarity reduces forum shopping, streamlines procedure, and aligns Indian arbitration practice with global best standards.

At Anhad Law, we view this decision as a meaningful step towards strengthening efficiency, decentralisation, and procedural certainty in arbitration cornerstones of India’s ambition to emerge as a preferred global arbitration hub.

© Anhad Law

Dhruv Gandhi, Partner and Ravi Kumar, Senior Associate